

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 097867

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE

CINCPAC PRIORITY

CINCUNC PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T STATE 097867

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MARR, MCAP, UNGA, KS, US

SUBJECT: RESTRUCTURING OF UNC

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

REF: STATE 69905 (NOTAL)

1. OUR BASIC APPROACH REGARDING UNC FOR NEXT FALL'S UNGA
IS TO PROCEED IN A WAY THAT WILL NOT JEOPARDIZE STABILITY
OF KOREAN PENINSULA BY PRESERVING ESSENTIAL SECURITY
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 097867

ARRANGEMENTS WHILE TRYING TO KEEP UNGA THREAT TO THESE
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, AND TO ROK'S DIPLOMATIC POSITION,
WITHIN MANAGEABLE BOUNDS. MORE PARTICULARLY, WE FAVOR
FOLLOWING COURSE:

A. LIMIT UNC TO ITS ARMISTICE-ADMINISTERING FUNCTIONS, IF FEASIBLE AND IF WE CAN WORK OUT SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE ROK. THIS WOULD DEMONSTRATE OUR GOOD FAITH IN MOVING TOWARD RESOLUTION OF UNC ISSUE. BY SO DOING WE WOULD HOPE TO KEEP OUR SUPPORTERS IN UNGA SOLIDLY WITH US, AND TO GARNER CRITICAL MARGIN OF VOTES AMONG THIRD WORLD MEMBERS.

B. EXPLOIT PROPOSED ACTION ON UNC BY ANNOUNCING IT PUBLICLY IN UN SECURITY COUNCIL AT AN EARLY DATE - SOMETIME

IN JUNE.

C. AVOID, HOWEVER, ANY UNILATERAL TERMINATION OF UNC. UNILATERAL TERMINATION, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF UNCERTAINTY AS TO HOW FAR NORTH KOREA MAY GO TO EXPLOIT INDOCHINA SETBACK, COULD GIVE COMPLETELY WRONG SIGNAL TO PYONGYANG AND OTHERS, AND COULD RISK EFFECTIVE CONTINUATION OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

D) MAKE AN ALL-OUT DIPLOMATIC EFFORT, AS WE DID LAST YEAR.

2. NARROW DEFEAT OF LAST YEAR'S DRAFT RESOLUTION BY TIE VOTE INDICATES THAT SUCCESS THIS YEAR WILL DEPEND ON OUR ABILITY TO DEMONSTRATE MOVEMENT, OR AT LEAST READINESS TO MOVE IN DIRECTION OF TERMINATION OF UNC. ALTHOUGH UNGA ACTIONS HAVE NO LEGAL EFFECT CONCERNING THE UNC AND US TROOP PRESENCE, SUCH HOSTILE RESOLUTIONS, IF PASSED, COULD CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT DIPLOMATIC DEFEAT, PARTICULARLY FOR THE ROK.

3. THIS APPROACH ALSO SEEMS LIKELY TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO ROK. DURING FOREIGN MINISTER KIM'S VISIT HERE, SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS OPENED PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS ON STRATEGY FOR 30TH UNGA. KIM INDICATED AGREEMENT WITH OUR PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS THAT THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 097867

OF AVOIDING CONFRONTATION WITH NORTH KOREAN SUPPORTERS ALONG LINES OF THAT OF LAST YEAR. DESPITE PUBLICLY EXPRESSED HOPES THAT KOREAN QUESTION COULD SOMEHOW BE TRANSFERRED TO SECURITY COUNCIL, KIM WAS PRIVATELY EXTREMELY PESSIMISTIC THAT DEBATE AND DEFEAT IN UNGA COULD BE AVOIDED, OR THAT UNSC MEETING SHOULD BE REQUESTED.

4. IN ADDRESSING THIS REQUIREMENT WE ARE CONSIDERING AN INITIATIVE INVOLVING A LIMITED REORGANIZATION OF THE UNC WHICH WOULD RESULT IN LOWERING ITS PROFILE. OUR GOAL

WOULD BE TO REMOVE IMPLICATION OF LINK BETWEEN THE UN'S INVOLVEMENT IN KOREA AND THE PRESENCE OF U.S. FORCES IN

THE PENINSULA. IT WOULD REINFORCE FOR UN MEMBERS THE LOGICAL PREMISE UNDERLYING OUR POLICY, I.E., THE NEED TO ASSURE CONTINUITY IN THE ARMISTICE ARRANGEMENTS IN RETURN FOR UNC DISSOLUTION. SUCH AN INITIATIVE WOULD HELP GIVE US A STRONGER TACTICAL POSITION IN NEW YORK AT NO COST TO OUR SUBSTANTIVE POSITION. ANY SUCH RESTRUCTURING SHOULD NOT BE MISREAD BY NORTH KOREA SINCE IT WOULD INVOLVE NO ESSENTIAL CHANGES IN OUR MILITARY POSITION.

5. IN ORDER TO GAIN MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE FROM THIS INITIATIVE WE WOULD PLAN TO SURFACE IT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

CONTEXT THROUGH A LETTER ANNOUNCING THE CHANGES IN LIGHT OF UNGA RESOLUTION 3333. SAME LETTER COULD INDICATE OUR WILLINGNESS TO TERMINATE THE UNC SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED ON ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF PRESERVING THE ARMISTICE. AT SAME TIME, WE AND ROKG COULD INDICATE OUR WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH OTHER PARTIES CONCERNED. WE WOULD ANTICIPATE NO FORMAL SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION, BUT WOULD HAVE OUR POSITION CLEARLY ON THE RECORD.

6. IF SUCH RESTRUCTURING IS TO GAIN MAXIMUM BENEFITS THE RESULTS MUST BE HIGHLY VISIBLE AND APPARENT. RESTRUCTURED CHARACTER OF UNC SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR AND, IF POSSIBLE, UNC HEADQUARTERS SHOULD BE PHYSICALLY RELOCATED DISTINCTLY SEPARATE FROM USFK. DISPLAY OF UN FLAG AND INSIGNIA WOULD BE LIMITED TO PANMUNJOM AND UNC HEADQUARTERS
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 097867

AND WOULD GENERALLY BE REMOVED FROM OTHER UNITS AND BASES. CINCUNC ROLE WOULD BE CLEARLY DEFINED AS RELATING TO MAINTENANCE AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

7. WE WOULD CONTINUE UNC LIAISON GROUP AND THAI AIR FORCE UNIT AND HEADQUARTERS (REAR) IN JAPAN BUT WOULD BE WILLING TO LET HONOR GUARD UNITS WITHDRAW.

8. OBVIOUSLY, THESE CHANGES WOULD HAVE EFFECT ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH ROK. THE MOST IMMEDIATE ISSUE TO BE ADDRESSED IS THAT OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL. ROKS HAVE MADE CLEAR THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO PLACE ROK FORCES UNDER AN AMERICAN COMMANDER LACKING UN COLORATION OR IN ABSENCE OF SOME FORM OF JOINT CONTROLLING BODY.

9. ALTERNATIVES FOR READDRESSING THE UNC POSTURE IN THE ROK INCLUDE:

A. TWO PARALLEL COMMANDS IN THE ABSENCE OF HOSTILITIES.

ALL -OK AND U" "O,-" WOULD BE UNDER THEIR RESPECTIVE OPCON LINES OF AUTHORITY, WITH A COMBINED HEADQUARTERS

ESTABLISHED FOR PLANNING/LIAISON. CINCUNC (IN PEACETIME) WOULD BE RESTRICTED TO RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARMISTICE AFFAIRS. IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES THE UNC WOULD RESUME A UNIFIED COMMAND ROLE, TO INCLUDE OPCON OF ROK FORCES. UNDER THIS ARRANGEMENT, WE WOULD EXPECT THE ROKG TO PUSH FOR SOME FORM OF COMBINED STAFF ARRANGEMENT AND COULD LIVE WITH A BODY CREATED FOR PLANNING AND LIAISON BUT WHICH HAS NO CONTROL FUNCTION, AND IS NOT TIED TO CONDITIONS SUCH AS FORCE LEVELS.

B. COMBINED HEADQUARTERS HEADED BY US GENERAL.

THIS ALTERNATIVE WOULD RETAIN OPCON OF ROK FORCES AND WITHHOLD PLACING ANY US UNITS UNDER OPCON OF THE CINC, COMBINED HQ'S DURING PEACETIME. IN WARTIME, OPCON OF US COMBAT FORCES WOULD BE PLACED UNDER THE CINC, COMBINED COMMAND. AS IN THE ABOVE ARRANGEMENT, UNC WOULD BE DETACHED AND BE SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR ARMISTICE AFFAIRS.

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 097867

C. SEPARATE CINCUNC AND SMALL COMBINED STAFF FROM PRESENT HEADQUARTERS.

STATUS QUO WOULD BE PRESERVED WITH CINCUNC RETAINING OPCON OVER ROK FORCES AND ARMISTICE AFFAIRS RESPONSIBILITIES WITH A COMBINED HEADQUARTERS ESTABLISHED FOR PLANNING/LIAISON. COMUSKOREA WOULD HAVE A CLEARLY DISTINCT HEADQUARTERS AND COMMAND STRUCTURE ALTHOUGH CINCUNC WOULD RETAIN HIS DUAL HAT. THIS CHANGE WOULD BE COSMETIC BUT WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF DOWNPLAYING OTHER VISIBLE SYMBOLS OF THE UNC.

10. SINCE THE PURPOSE OF CHANGES IS TO INFLUENCE UNGA DEBATE TIMING IS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE. WE WOULD HOPE TO COMPLETE CONSULTATIONS WITH ROKG IN MAY. THESE CONSULTATIONS WILL NECESSARILY BE LIMITED TO THE BROAD OUTLINES OF AN AGREED PLAN, AS TIME WOULD PRECLUDE RESOLVING SUCH COMPLICATED ISSUES AS RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, COMMAND AND CONTROL, ETC. THIS WOULD ALLOW US TO CONSULT WITH OUR CLOSE ALLIES AND TO NOTIFY SECURITY COUNCIL OF CHANGES BY EARLY TO MID-JUNE. IMPLEMENTATION OF CHANGES NEED NOT BEGIN UNTIL RESTRUCTURING IS PUBLICLY SURFACED BY LETTER. HOWEVER, DEPENDENT UPON PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS, THE MOST VISIBLE ACTIONS SHOULD BE COMPLETED PRIOR TO UNGA DEBATE.

11. WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING EMBASSY COMMENTS ON POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS BEFORE AUTHORIZING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ROKG. CINCPAC AND CINCUNC ADDRESSAL OF IMPLICATIONS REGARDING ALTERNATIVES FOR RESTRUCTURING THE UNC AND COMMENTS ON PROPOSED SCENARIO FOR LOWERING

THE UN PROFILE WILL BE FORWARDED TO JCS NLT 2ND MAY 1975.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 26 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLICIES, ARMISTICE, SECURITY, MILITARY PLANS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 27 APR 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: johnsorg
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE097867
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: EA/K:EKELLY:AP
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D750147-1064
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t197504104/baaaaidj.tel
Line Count: 221
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: johnsorg
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 01 MAY 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <01 MAY 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <10 NOV 2003 by johnsorg>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: n/a
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, MCAP, KS, US, UNGA, UNC
To: SEOUL
CINCPAC
CINCUNC INFO TOKYO
USUN N Y
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

